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Introduction 
Your response nicely illustrates the point that there is more than one way to be a 
realist about language. You certainly deploy greater knowledge of applied linguistics 
than I am able to, but my original piece is also necessarily brief on details due to an 
ambition to cover a broad range of issues. This lack of detail is perhaps one reason 
why you seem to misunderstand several aspects of my argument and I therefore 
welcome the opportunity to clarify it.  
Ontology and theory 
In counterposing the theories of linguistic systems and norm circles as starkly as you 
do, you perhaps obscure that there are two different kinds of issue to be considered 
here. The first, and that upon which the original paper focussed, is whether each of 
these concepts corresponds to some real and causally potent force. This is not an 
either/or choice: in principle one, both, or neither of these two concepts might refer 
to a causally powerful class of forces.  
To justify the claim that either is causally significant we need an explanation of the 
material form of entities of the type concerned and the mechanism by which such 
entities could produce the powers claimed for them. I have gone to some lengths 
elsewhere to demonstrate the material structures and causal mechanisms behind 
my claims for norm circles (Elder-Vass, 2010; Elder-Vass, 2012). However, I have not 
yet seen an adequate account of the material basis of the entities that you call 
linguistic systems and of the mechanisms by which such systems could have the 
powers claimed for them, if these systems take a form similar to Popper’s World 3 
and Archer’s adaptation of this for her Cultural System. I do indeed reject the claim 
that “ideas are sui generis real”. Ideas exist as mental properties of human 
individuals. Texts such as books are material objects that, in conjunction with our 
grasp of linguistic practices, can be used to communicate ideas (imperfectly but 
often very effectively), and may therefore play an important part in transmitting 
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both information and normative pressures. As a consequence they play a significant 
role in (contingently and imperfectly) aligning our beliefs and dispositions, but at no 
point in the process of writing or reading is there an idea or a linguistic system that 
exists outside our heads. 
This is not to say that all versions of the concept of linguistic systems are necessarily 
empty of empirical content. Perhaps the most plausible version of the concept would 
refer to the form taken by a set of interlinked linguistic dispositions when those 
dispositions exist in a human individual, particularly if we could identify systematic 
similarities in such systems across multiple individuals. Such similarities in turn 
would need to be explained, and one might expect them to be the product of a 
combination of innate similarities in our capacities and similar environmental 
pressures (including the influence of norm circles). Perhaps a concept like this could 
do some of the work that you want a linguistic system to do, but it is not something 
that exists outside the heads of the individuals concerned. 
The second issue is the question of which forces actually contribute to the causation 
of particular events. Scientific realism implies that events are caused by multiple 
interacting powers; linguistic events could be caused, for example, by the interacting 
causal powers of human individuals, including their innate linguistic capacities, of 
linguistic norm circles (operating through the effects that our experience of past 
normative pressure has on our neural networks and thus our linguistic dispositions), 
and indeed the non-linguistic material and social context. Hence, neither linguistic 
systems nor norm circles could be universal and complete explainers of all or indeed 
any linguistic phenomena, and I certainly do not make such claims for norm circles, 
as you seem to suggest I do. For any given linguistic phenomenon, the correct causal 
explanation may involve many other factors as well as either (or, logically, both) of 
these. The claim that some aspects of language use are causally influenced by 
linguistic norms does not entail that all aspects of it are determined by those norms. 
I am therefore just as happy as you to recognise, for example, the lengthy historical 
processes, the contributions of individual language users and interactions, the 
artefacts and the political interests that contribute to the development and 
maintenance of language. Your discussion of these issues is just one of many cases in 
which you appear to cite interesting and worthwhile arguments about language as if 
they undermined my case when there is no obvious reason to think they are 
incompatible with it. Nor, for a further example, do my views on the causal powers 
behind language entail that it does not provide a set of resources that people can 
and do use to do many, often creative, things.  
Clarifying norm circles 
Several of your comments depend on reading my account of norm circles in ways 
that I did not intend, including some that I have explicitly contradicted elsewhere. 
1) You suggest that there are methodological problems with the concept of a norm 
circle. As the original paper made clear, “A norm circle is the group of people who 
are committed to supporting a particular norm, by endorsing and enforcing it in their 
relations with others”. This is a phenomenon that is clearly open to empirical 
investigation, for example by interviewing subjects about their experience of norm 
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endorsing behaviour, who they felt had influenced their own acceptance or rejection 
of a norm, whether they felt when endorsing a norm that they did so with the 
backing of some wider force, how wide they felt the group of people supporting the 
norm was, whether they had experienced evidence of conflicting norms in other 
social environments, and so on. This does raise methodological questions, though 
not, on the whole, the ones that you suggest. There is rather a subtle issue, for 
example, over the question of whether merely conforming to a norm constitutes 
endorsing it; given the extent to which we appear to build our sense of the 
normative environment on the basis of observed behaviour, it may often be the case 
that it does. This does not mean, however, that a norm circle is defined by 
conforming behaviour. First, it is defined in terms of endorsing and not conforming, 
and there are other types of endorsing behaviour that are also important: notably 
praising, rewarding, criticising, and punishing. Second, there are cases where people 
conform to norms while expressing their disapproval of them, thus placing 
themselves outside the norm circle concerned. Third, norm circles are defined in 
terms of commitment, in a sense that entails a tendency to endorsing behaviour, but 
like all other causal tendencies this one may be frustrated in particular cases. I may 
believe it is wrong to steal but refrain from trying to endorse or enforce this norm 
when faced with a mugger brandishing a knife. I may believe that a certain 
grammatical construction is outdated and inappropriate, but refrain from saying so 
when it is used by someone in a position of authority over me. Empirical 
identification of who is and is not a member of a given norm circle is therefore 
challenging but not necessarily impossible. The issues discussed above would require 
careful attention to a series of complexities, and there may be borderline cases on 
which it is difficult to make a principled judgement. But there are empirical 
difficulties in identifying the boundaries of many phenomena and realists accept that 
causal powers may not be empirically obvious. These challenges therefore do not 
constitute an argument that norm circles do not exist, cannot be researched, or are 
not causally effective.  
2) A second feature of the definition referred to above is that norm circles support “a 
particular norm”. Norm circles are associated with individual norms, such as ‘avoid 
double negatives’ and ‘you should not steal’. I have never suggested, for example, 
that “speakers of English” or “the Catholic Church” are norm circles, so arguments 
about the nature of such groups cannot plausibly be considered as undermining the 
concept of norm circles. It is rather odd to suggest that I “have to abandon the 
notion of the norm circle or decide that a large institution is composed of many 
different, possibly competing and probably not consistent, norm circles” since the 
latter has always been my clearly stated position, at least in the sense of institution 
that is being used here. The Catholic Church is an organisation, and one that is 
implicated in a complex and sometimes contradictory way in a large number of 
normative practices. As I have agued elsewhere, organisations are a different kind of 
social structure than norm circles, although they are interdependent with norm 
circles in some interesting ways (Elder-Vass, 2010: chapter 7). Turning to the 
practices of English speakers, these are, as you point out, widely divergent and often 
in conflict. This is, in fact, a strength of the norm circle concept, as opposed to 
concepts like the speech community, which remains rather widespread in 
sociolinguistics, since I argue that there is a separate norm circle for each linguistic 
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norm and that any given ‘community’ may include norm circles endorsing a variety 
of divergent and even conflicting norms (Elder-Vass, 2012: chapter 6). It is difficult to 
see how this diversity could be explained by any conception of language that places 
explanatory power in a single unified element, such as a speech community or a 
linguistic system.  
3) One reading of norm that perhaps contributes to these misunderstandings is the 
obsolete Parsonian functionalist idea that norms are always stabilisers of the 
established social system, and thus that all norms are official ones established by 
powerful interests. My view is that there are norm circles for official linguistic norms 
and for linguistic norms that help to sustain systems of stratification, but there are 
also norm circles for linguistic norms that are positively disruptive of official norms 
and systems of power.1 Amongst English speakers, for example, there is a norm 
circle for ‘use double negatives’ as well as one for ‘avoid double negatives’, and 
these are in competition with each other. The concept of norm circles entails no 
judgement as to which of these is more valid in any respect. 
4) As you point out, my previous work on language has been more oriented to signs 
than to grammar (Elder-Vass, 2012: chapters 5-7). Following Chomsky, you suggest 
that grammar is not open to normative explanations and needs, rather, to be 
explained as the product of our innate language capacity. As the original paper made 
clear, I do see innate features of the brain as one important factor contributing to 
our grammatical competence and practices, but there is also a social influence on 
grammar. Of course, if we define grammar as that element of our innate capacities 
that sustains all humanly possible syntactic structures then it cannot be socially 
influenced. But if we take grammar to be the actual rules that we follow 
(subconsciously, on most occasions) in constructing sentences then they are clearly 
normative: most obviously, they are different amongst speakers of different 
languages, and they are sustained by systems of linguistic education and normative 
pressures. This is entirely compatible with recognising that the range of viable 
grammatical practices is both constrained and enabled by an innate language 
capacity. We need both the innate capacity and the norm circles to explain which 
grammatical practices actually prevail in any given social context, and indeed other 
causal factors may influence this too. These may include, for example, which ways of 
speaking are physically easier given our biology, the use of various ways of speaking 
as indicators of status, and technical developments. 
5) This brings us to the question of explaining linguistic change. While it is true that 
“norm circles work better as explanations of morphostasis than of morphogenesis” 
this does not constitute a problem for the theory, for at least two reasons. First, 
given a world in which events are multiply determined, we can recognise that other 
factors may play a leading role in linguistic change without this impacting on the 
argument that norm circles play a central role in sustaining linguistic stability and 
indeed spreading new practices. To take one of the simpler cases, some new words 
are developed to name new inventions, and spread as knowledge and experience of 
                                                     
1 Cresswell, Karimova and Brock express this point nicely by contrasting hegemonic norm circles with 
norm circles of resistance (forthcoming). 
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those inventions spread. This process is no doubt supported by the development of 
norm circles that advocate use of the new word (and perhaps discourage the use of 
others) to refer to the invention, but the original linguistic innovation is not a 
product of such a norm circle, nor is the spreading need for an appropriate word. 
Secondly, the diverse intersectionality of norm circles in the contemporary world is a 
positive enabler of normative change. If there were only one speech community or 
one linguistic system governing our use of language, it is difficult to see how 
linguistic innovation could proceed, but if there are multiple, potentially competing, 
norm circles, than change can proceed through a process in which one norm circle 
gains influence at the expense of another. These issues are discussed at more length 
(though not for specifically linguistic cases) in earlier work (Elder-Vass, 2010: 133-8). 
Conclusion 
This short and necessarily incomplete reply has sought to correct some of the 
misunderstandings of norm circles implicit in your response and to reinforce some 
doubts over your version of the linguistic system, as I understand it.2 Norm circles, it 
argues, provide an important part of the explanation for linguistic practices, but 
always in conjunction with other interacting causal powers.  
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2
 One issue I am conscious of neglecting is the question of what ‘a language’ could be. On this, the 
reader is referred to the discussion of cultures, and the brief extension of this to languages, in Elder-
Vass (2012: 159-173). 
